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Retaliatory withdrawals from rental housing market:  
Drouet v Superior Court, 2003 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
In unlawful detainer action, landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw property from rental 
market under Ellis Act will defeat statutory defense of retaliatory eviction. 
Drouet v Superior Court (2003) 31 C4th 583, 3 CR3d 205 
Drouet (Landlord) owned a two-unit apartment building in San Francisco, which has a 
municipal rent control ordinance. Over the years, Landlord and the Tenants of one unit had 
conflicts involving the tenancy. In 1999, Landlord began Ellis Act (Govt C §§7060–7060.7) 
proceedings for the building. Under the Ellis Act, a residential landlord in a rent control 
jurisdiction may go out of the residential rental business by withdrawing the rental property from 
the market, and may recover possession of the property by bringing an unlawful detainer to evict 
the tenants. Landlord complied with all the procedur s and served Tenants with written notice 
terminating the tenancy and a 60-day notice to quit. Tenants did not quit and Landlord filed a 
complaint for unlawful detainer. Tenants answered an  lleged four affirmative defenses, 
including retaliatory eviction under CC §1942.5. After Landlord moved for summary 
adjudication on each of the defenses, the trial court granted the motion, in part, but denied it with 
respect to retaliatory eviction without considering whether Landlord’s invocation of the Ellis Act 
was bona fide. The appellate division of the superior court granted Landlord a writ of mandate 
and the court of appeal agreed, holding that in “unlawful detainer proceedings properly 
commenced under the Ellis Act, a tenant may not raise n affirmative defense of retaliatory 
eviction to prevent displacement.” 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding thata tenant may raise the statutory defense 
of retaliatory eviction in unlawful detainer proceedings brought under the Ellis Act—but the 
landlord’s bona fide intent to withdraw the property f om the rental market under the Act defeats 
the defense of retaliatory eviction. The court stated hat, on remand, the superior court must 
consider whether Landlord had asserted a bona fide intent to withdraw the property and, if so, 
whether Tenants had controverted that intent. 
The court explained that under the Ellis Act a resid ntial landlord cannot be compelled to 
continue to offer accommodations in the property. However, the Act specifically states that it 
does not supersede §1942.5. Govt C §7060.1(d). Therefor , the court had to harmonize 
Landlord’s right to withdraw his property from the r ntal market with the statutory defense of 
retaliatory eviction by construing the two statutes together. The court determined that permitting 
a landlord to invoke in good faith his or her right to withdraw property from the rental market 
would not replace, set aside, or annul §1942.5, explaining that a landlord’s withdrawal of 
property from the rental market under the Ellis Actconstituted an exercise of rights under a law 
pertaining to the hiring of property as specifically a lowed by §1942.5(d). 
The court then rejected both Landlord’s argument tha once the landlord has complied with the 
Act’s procedural requirements there can be no defens  of retaliatory eviction, and Tenants’ 
argument that Landlord still had to demonstrate an absence of retaliatory motive to prevail in the 
unlawful detainer action. The court instead held that landlords must assert their invocation of the 
Ellis Act “in good faith” (31 C4th at 596; see §1942.5(e)): 
[T]he proper way to construe the statute when a landlord seeks to evict a tenant under the Ellis 
Act, and the tenant answers by invoking the retaliatory eviction defense under section 1942.5, is 
to hold that the landlord may nonetheless prevail by asserting a good faith—i.e., a bona fide—
intent to withdraw the property from the rental market. If the tenant controverts the landlord’s 
good faith, the landlord must establish the existence of the bona fide intent at a trial or hearing by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
Therefore, the court concluded that a landlord may go out of business and evict the tenants—
even if the landlord has a retaliatory motive—so long as the landlord also has the bona fide intent 
to go out of business. 
Justice Brown concurred, writing separately to exprss her understanding on three points the 
superior court will have to consider on remand: 
1. Landlord’s filing of a notice of intent to withdraw his property from the rental market, as 
required by the San Francisco Municipal Code, creates  nonstatutory rebuttable presumption 
that Landlord’s intent is bona fide.  
2. Tenants will, therefore, bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to overcome this 
presumption, i.e., sufficient to establish that Landlord intends to re-rent the property.  
3. Landlord’s motive in withdrawing his property from the rental market is irrelevant.  
Justice Moreno, joined by Justices Kennard and Werdegar, in dissent opined that nothing in 
the language of the Ellis Act or the statutes governing the defense of retaliatory eviction permits 
a landlord to evict tenants under the Ellis Act for a retaliatory purpose. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: It is inevitable that when you have two statutes each deferring to 
the other, as the Ellis Act and the retaliatory eviction code section do, a court has no real 
guidance on what to do, and any outcome is going to be arbitrary. I think the court of appeal 
was more candid than the supreme court in admitting hat it was making a de facto policy 
decision when it decided this case. The high court’s purported reconciliation of the two 
statutes can hardly to be said to come from their plain language, as the court’s 4–3 split 
shows. 
From a practical point of view (rather than from a policy level or claim of pretended 
statutory interpretation), the majority decision certainly leads to workable results; indeed, 
far more workable than the minority outcome would have produced. A landlord who has 
tired of hearing and responding to his tenant’s complaints will rarely be able to show that 
his motive for withdrawing his property from the rental market was not retaliatory. Even if 
the decision was not taken in order to “get even” with the tenant, if the decision was made 
in response to the tenant’s behavior, it might well qualify as retaliatory. Thus, the majority 
opinion lifts a relatively impossible evidentiary burden off the landlord’s back by not 
treating him as retaliatory just because he concluded that it wasn’t worth staying in the 
rental business in light of his tenant’s demands. 
The new test imposed on a landlord should be easy to meet (and stupid to try to avoid). 
She need merely show a bona fide intent to withdraw her building from the rental market. 
The fact that she probably also intends to sell it thereafter, as an empty, i.e., untenanted, 
building should not impair her intent to withdraw, since selling and renting clearly 
constitute different activities and markets. A landlor  could sell her units even while 
rented—thereby preserving the tenancies—or she can empty the building out (under this 
decision) and then hope to sell it empty. As a result, the population of potential purchasers 
may be reduced, because they cannot immediately put the property back into the rental 
market. However, in this case, the property was a two-unit building and it might be quite 
attractive to two tenants looking to use the tenancy-i -common route as their escape into 
ownership. Similarly, a single family trying to get out of the rental market may find the 
property attractive since, even with the costs of remodeling to convert two units into one 
single-family house, the resulting property may indee , on resale, command a far higher 
price than a tenanted two-unit in a rent-controlled market such as San Francisco. —Roger 
Bernhardt 
 
